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STORIES OF RIGHTS: DEVELOPING MORAL 
THEORY AND ·TEACHING LAW 
Patricia A. Cain* 
Jean C. Love** 
RIGHTS, REsTITUTION, & RISK: EsSAYS IN MORAL THEORY. By 
Judith Jarvis Thomson. Edited by William Parent. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 1986. Pp. x, 260. $12.95. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Judith Jarvis Thomson is a teacher of philosophy and we are law 
school teachers. As teachers in different but related disciplines, we 
share a common pedagogical approach: use of the case method. In 
law, our cases are stories of real-life struggles with real-life resolutions. 
But in the law school classroom, the creative teacher will often push 
beyond the real life story. In Socratic fashion, the law school teacher 
will pose a series of hypotheticals to test the students' understanding 
of the case. Often the law school teacher prepares for class by search-
ing for the perfectly framed hypothetical. Judith Jarvis Thomson is 
the quintessential expert at creating the perfectly framed hypothetical. 
Her most well-known hypothetical is "The Famous Violinist." It is 
intended to pose the problem of abortion in a different light. She asks 
you to imagine this: 
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed 
with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has 
been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lov-
ers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you 
alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped 
you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into 
yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood 
as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, "Look, 
we're sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you - we would 
never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the 
violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. 
But never mind, it's only for nine months. By then he will have recov-
ered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you." Is it 
morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation? [pp. 2-3] 
A Defense of Abortion, the first essay in Rights, Restitution, & Risk, 
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begins with this story of the famous violinist. The reader will at once 
see the many ways in which a person's being plugged to the famous 
violinist is like and unlike a pregnant woman's being plugged to her 
unborn child. 
And if "The Famous Violinist" does not capture your imagination, 
then consider the case of people-seeds which "drift about in the air like 
pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root 
in your carpets or upholstery. You don't want children, so you fix up 
your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best you can buy" (p. 
12). But, as sometimes happens, one of your screens is defective and 
so a seed drifts through and takes root in your living room. Does it 
have the right to stay? 
Welcome to the world of Judith Jarvis Thomson, a world inhabited 
by famous violinists, people-seeds, and just plain ordinary folk like Al-
fred and Bert. Alfred pours cleaning fluid into his wife's coffee (wish-
ing her dead, of course), whereas Bert merely stands by and watches 
his wife mistakenly pour cleaning fluid into her own coffee (wishing 
her dead, of course). Does Alfred do a thing that is worse than what 
Bert does? Is killing worse than letting die? (p. 78). 
William Parent, the editor of Rights, Restitution, & Risk, is to be 
commended for collecting Thompson's essays on moral theory, 
thereby making them available in a single volume. His choice was to 
organize the essays by topic, rather than chronologically. Most of the 
essays are about "rights." Thomson's concept of "rights" is some-
thing that has developed over time. Thus, the reader may find it help-
ful to note the dates of original publication of these essays by referring 
to the list of sources at the end of the book. 
Thomson is fascinated with the meaning of the "right to life," a 
fascination she readily admits (p. 22). She is also intrigued by the 
meaning of property rights (pp. 49-77). In her afterword, she suggests 
that, when confronted with a puzzling concept, one should ask for its 
cash value. Thus she poses the question: "What is the cash value of 
having a right?" (p. 252). Throughout the book, Thomson makes re-
peated connections between rights to life and property and the legal 
entitlement to compensation for a violation or infringement of those 
rights. It is her emphasis on this connection between rights and the 
cash value of rights that appears to have given rise to the book's title. 
What the title does not capture is the fact that this collection of 
essays is really a collection of stories. Yet this may be the most impor-
tant feature of Thomson's writing. As she explains in the afterword: 
The reader of these essays will see that I regard examples, stories, 
cases - whether actual or invented - as of central importance to moral 
theory. . . . There are two reasons for thinking them of central impor-
tance. In the first place, we do not even know what accepting this or 
that candidate moral principle would commit us to until we see what it 
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tells us about what people ought or ought not do in this or that (so far as 
possible) concretely described set of circumstances. 
Second, and more interesting, it is precisely our moral views about 
examples, stories, and cases which constitute the data for moral theo-
rizing. [p. 257] 
Examples, stories, and cases are the tools of both the law school 
teacher1 and the moral theorist. Thomson, as moral theorist, provides 
us with tools that work especially well in two of the law school courses 
that we are currently teaching. Those courses are torts and feminist 
legal theory. In the next two sections, we will present our separate 
thoughts on the richness that Thomson's stories can add to these 
courses. In the concluding section, we will warn of the risk of strip-
ping stories of their context - a risk that may be shared by the moral 
theorist and the law professor. 
II. TORTS2 
A. Rights and Wrongs 
In the afterword to Rights, Restitution, & Risk, Thomson asserts 
that "[c]ontact with law has been immensely enriching to moral the-
ory in recent years" (p. 257). Why? Because the purpose of moral 
theory is to examine human action, and to explain "what makes those 
acts right which are right, and what makes those acts wrong which are 
wrong" (p. 256). 
Although one might expect moral theory to be simple, Professor 
Thomson emphasizes that one of the central messages of her essays is 
"precisely that a moral theory adequate to its explanatory job is going 
to have to be a more complex affair than we might have expected it to 
be" (p. 255). When she wants to remind herself of the complexity and 
variety of human responses to a moral problem, she turns to the litera-
ture of the law. By her account, casebooks are "anthologies of short 
stories, each of which ends in a moral problem" (p. 256). She values 
cases both for their facts and for the judges' arguments in support of 
their decisions (p. 256). 
As a torts professor, I was delighted to discover that many of Pro-
fessor Thomson's essays are based on classic tort cases that appear in 
the standard casebooks. 3 After reading and rereading Rights, Restitu-
1. See, e.g., Robertson, The Legal Philosophy of Leon Green, 56 TEXAS L. REv. 393, 422-23 
(1978). Robertson notes: 
A case may comprehend all the important processes of government much as a single drop of 
water mirrors a universe, or the life of a single human being has within itself the history of 
mankind .... 
. . . If the student gains the power to read a case ... he [or she] inevitably becomes a 
critic and thereby develops his [or her] creative power. 
Id. at 422-23. 
2. Professor Love wrote this section. 
3. For example, Some Ruminations on Rights, p. 48, and Rights and Compensation, p. 66, are 
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tion, & Risk, I became convinced that contact with Professor Thom-
son's essays could be immensely enriching to the teaching of tort law. 
In this section, I aim to make Professor Thomson's essays more acces-
sible to torts professors by summarizing several of them, and discuss-
ing how these essays might be incorporated into a typical law school 
classroom discussion. 
As a moral theorist, Professor Thomson is particularly interested 
in the subject of rights (p. 251). Several of her essays consider the 
question: "What have you got when you've got a right?" (p. 251). She 
believes that this question must be resolved before we can respond in a 
reasoned way to another question: "[W]hat rights [do] we have?" (p. 
251). Torts professors, of course, are extremely concerned about both 
questions. It is true that the term "tort" is usually defined as a "civil 
wrong."4 It is also true that some people "think of the law of [t]orts as 
the law of wrongs."5 Nevertheless, torts "might better be said to be a 
law for the creation and protection of rights. " 6 In Professor Seavey's 
words, the "function [of tort law] has continuously been to mark out 
new areas for the protection of human interests."7 Tort law enforces 
rights through awards of damages or equitable relief for legal harms 
suffered as the result of another person's breach of a duty which is the 
correlative of a right. 8 Since tort law deals with rights and duties, the 
concept of a right and its function in the legal decisionmaking process 
is of great significance to torts professors. 
Professor Thomson is fascinated by the question of whether rights 
are absolute, and if not, what it means to have a right. In considering 
these questions, she draws extensively on the intentional tort literature 
involving the privileges of self-defense and necessity. 
B. Self-Defense 
In her essay Self-Defense and Rights (p. 33), Professor Thomson 
examines the "right to life," which presumably includes "the right to 
not be killed" (p. 33). If Aggressor has a right to life, she wants to 
based on the classic private necessity cases. See Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 
456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910); Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908). Remarks on Causa-
tion and Liability, p. 192, is based on two classic cases regarding causation and multiple defen-
dants. See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 
Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980). 
4. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS§ l, at 2 
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. 
5. W. SEAVEY, COGITATIONS ON TORTS 5 (1954). 
6. Id. 
7. Id. Professor Seavey goes on to say that to speak of torts as the law of wrongs is to 
misconceive its function. Instead, it "should be regarded as a body of rules which provide com-
pensation for harm caused by another." Id. at 6. 
8. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § l, at 2; l s. SPEISER, c. KRAUSE & A. 
GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS§§ 1.8-1.9 (1983); Coval & Smith, Rights, Goals, and 
Hard Cases, 1 LAW & PHIL. 451, 451-52 (1982). 
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know "[p]recisely why [it is] permissible for Victim to use [an] anti-
tank gun on Aggressor" when Aggressor is driving a tank toward vic-
tim with the intent of killing Victim (p. 33). As a way of considering 
this question, she evaluates the three alternative explanations that are 
typically put forward to justify the privilege of self-defense. 
The first explanation she calls "forfeit" (p. 33). Under this theory, 
Aggressor has forfeited his right to life by attacking Victim. Thomson 
finds this theory totally unsatisfactory because it suggests that Victim 
could shoot Aggressor even if Aggressor's tank stalled and Aggressor 
got out to examine the engine, falling and breaking both ankles (pp. 
33-34). 
The second explanation she calls "specification," including both 
moral and factual specification (p. 37). Friends of specification say 
that having a right to life doesn't include having a general right to not 
be killed. Instead, having a right to life includes having a right to not 
be killed under specified circumstances (p. 37). Moral specification 
says that having a right to life includes having a right to not be killed 
wrongly or unjustly (p. 37). Factual specification says that having a 
right to life includes having a right to not be killed only under certain 
circumstances (p. 38). For example, "all you have is a right to not be 
killed if you are not in [the] process of trying to kill a person, where 
that person has every reason to believe he can preserve his life only by 
killing you" (p. 38). 
Thomson used to be a friend of moral specification (p. 37). How-
ever, she has now abandoned this justification for the privilege of self-
defense. She offers the following clear and witty explanation of her 
dissatisfaction with moral specification: · 
Consider Victim. We were asked to explain why it is permissible for 
Victim to use his anti-tank gun on Aggressor, thereby killing him; and 
consider the following answer: "The reason why it is permissible for 
Victim to kill Aggressor is that Aggressor has no right to not be killed -
he only has a right to not be killed wrongly or unjustly - and in killing 
Aggressor, Victim would not be killing Aggressor wrongly or unjustly." 
One does not mind all circles, but this circle is too small. [p. 37.] 
Thomson is even less enamored of the factual specification theory (p. 
38). It, too, leads to circular reasoning, because the friend of factual 
specification has "to figure out when it is permissible to kill, and then 
tailor, accordingly, his account of what right it is which is the most we 
have in respect of life" (p. 39). 
The third explanation for the privilege of self-defense Thomson 
calls "overriding" (p. 42). Unlike the first two explanations, which 
assume that all rights are absolute, the "overriding" theory recognizes 
that some rights, including the right to life, are nonabsolute (p. 42). 
An overrider then says: "[T]he reason why it is permissible for Victim 
to kill Aggressor is the fact that, the circumstances being what they 
are, Aggressor's right to not be killed is overridden" (p. 42). By what 
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is Aggressor's right to life overridden? By the "utility" of Victim's 
action or by Victim's "more stringent right" to kill a person who is 
currently giving Victim every reason to believe that he will kill Victim 
unless Victim kills him (pp. 43-46). But Thomson is not convinced 
that the benefits of Victim's conduct would always outweigh the costs 
(p. 43). Nor is she satisfied that there is any principled way in which 
to determine when Victim's rights are more stringent than Aggressor's 
(pp. 43-47), particularly if both of them claim a "natural right," that 
is, "a right a human being has simply by virtue of being a human 
being" (p. 44). 
In short, none of the above three typical explanations for the privi-
lege of self-defense withstand Thomson's scrutiny. She has demon-
strated that we don't know what it means to have a "right to life" in a 
case in which the defendant claims the privilege of self-defense. Even 
Thomson is surprised at the outcome of her analysis: 
I do not for a moment think it a novel idea that we stand in need of an 
account of just how an appeal to a right may be thought to function in 
ethical discussion. What strikes me as of interest, however, is that the 
need for such an account shows itself even in a case which might have 
been thought to be transparent. [p. 48.] 
Assigning or summarizing Professor Thomson's essay could 
greatly enrich a classroom discussion of the law of self-defense. Most 
students take it for granted that there is both a right to life and a 
privilege of self-defense.9 Thomson's essay will force students to think 
more carefully about the tension between the two principles. It also 
will create a springboard for a discussion of other possible explana-
tions for the law of self-defense. For example, Dean Prosser takes the 
position that the "privilege of self-defense rests upon the necessity of 
permitting a person who is attacked to take reasonable steps to prevent 
harm to himself or herself, where there is no time to resort to the 
law."10 And Dean Kadish suggests that the privilege of self-defense 
derives from "the right of every person to the law's protection against 
the deadly threats of others." 11 He asserts that if this right is to have 
any content, it must "include maintenance of a legal liberty to resist 
deadly threats by all necessary means, including killing the 
aggressor." 12 
9. In fact, early common Jaw courts (applying principles of strict liability) did not recognize a 
privilege of self-defense. A slayer who killed in self-defense "deserves, but needs a pardon" in 
order to avoid a death sentence. I F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GREY, THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 3.11 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter HARPER & JAMES]; c. MORRIS & c. MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON 
TORTS 33 (1980); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 19, at 124. Not until approximately 1400 
was the privilege of self-defense recognized by the law of crimes and the Jaw of torts. Id. 
10. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 19, at 124. 
11. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 
871, 884 (1976). 
12. Id. at 884-85. For more general discussions of the law of self-defense and the distinction 
between justification and excuse, see Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the 
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Professor Thomson does not offer her own explanation of the privi-
lege of self-defense. Unlike torts professors, she is less concerned 
about the law of self-defense and more concerned about what it means 
to have a right. From her perspective, it is enough that she has proved 
that the right to life is not absolute (p. 40). 
C. Private and Public Necessity 
In her next two essays, Some Ruminations on Rights (p. 49) and 
Rights and Compensation (p. 66), Thomson explores more fully the 
question of whether rights are absolute. She recognizes that there are 
two good reasons for preferring to say that rights are inviolable. First 
of all, "assertions of rights have a kind of moral force that no other 
moral assertions do"; "rights are trumps" (p. 254). Second, a moral 
theory which regards rights as absolute is simpler than one which does 
not (p. 254). Although she thinks that these are two good reasons for 
preferring a moral theory that rights are inviolable, she does not think 
these reasons are good enough because, in fact, very few rights are 
truly absolute (p. 255). A moral theory which does not allow for the 
infringement of rights cannot "explain the moral phenomena which 
need explaining as well as one which does" (p. 255). To prove her 
point, Professor Thomson turns to the law regarding the defense of 
private necessity. 13 
Suppose, she says, that you are on a backpacking trip in the high 
mountain country when a blizzard strikes with such ferocity that your 
life is imperiled (p. 66). May you trespass on private land, smash in 
the window of an unoccupied cabin, help yourself to the food supply, 
and burn the wooden furniture in the fireplace to keep warm? Yes, she 
says, it is morally and legally permissible for you to do all of these 
things (pp. 66, 68). Therefore, it is inaccurate to say that the owner of 
the cabin has an "absolute" right in either the real or the personal 
property (pp. 55-57). 
On the other hand, it would also be inaccurate to say that the cabin 
owner has "no right" in the property because the law does require that 
you compensate the cabin owner for the loss of the window, food, and 
wooden furniture. 14 To explain what needs explaining here, Thomson 
Concepts and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155 (1987); Fletcher, The Right and the Rea-
sonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949 (1985); Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, 
49 LA w & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (Summer 1986); Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justifi-
cation and Excuse, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1897 (1984); Horowitz, Justification and Excuse in the 
Program of the Criminal Law, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (Summer 1986). 
13. For a summary of the law of private necessity, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§§ 197, 263 (1965); 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 9, at § 1.22; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 
4, at § 24; Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and 
Personality, 39 HARV. L. REV. 307 (1926). 
14. See pp. 40-41, 54, 59, and 253 for Thomson's references to similar fact situations in 
which compensation would be allowed. Thomson recognizes that full compensation is appropri-
ate in the hypothetical under discussion because you exercised the privilege of private necessity to 
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distinguishes between violating a right and infringing a right. You in-
fringe a right whenever you interfere with a right; you violate a right 
only if you infringe it by acting unjustly or wrongly (pp. 40, 51 & n.3). 
In the case of the cabin owner, you would be infringing some of the 
cabin owner's property rights, but you would not be violating any of 
them (p. 54). 
Moral theorists will continue to debate what it means to have a 
right, and whether rights are absolute. Furthermore, they will chal-
lenge Judith Jarvis Thomson's assertion that the concept of "infringe-
ment of a right" is the "only adequate explanation" for the legal 
operation of the incomplete defense of private necessity (pp. 253-54). 
Professor Jules Coleman, for example, takes the position that the priv-
ilege of private necessity may be explained equally well by a "more 
general principle of justice" whereby you must pay compensation to 
the cabin owner for "wrongfully interfering with a legitimate interest," 
even though you did not violate any "right" of the cabin owner's. 15 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that Thomson's distinction between 
an "infringement of a right" and a "violation of a right" is useful to 
torts professors. It helps to explain much of the law regarding private 
necessity. For example, it helps to explain why the cabin owner may 
not eject the trespasser (i.e., the trespasser has not violated the owner's 
real property rights).16 It also facilitates a student's understanding of 
why the cabin owner may not obtain nominal damages in an action for 
trespass to land (no "violation"),17 but may recover compensatory 
damages in an action for trespass to chattels (no "violation," but 
"infringement"). 18 
Professor Thomson's analysis of the law of private necessity con-
tains other hypotheticals that will carry the classroom discussion be-
yond the cases in the standard torts casebooks. For example, she 
poses the following fact situation: 
There is a child who will die if he is not given some drug in the near 
future. The only bit of that drug which can be obtained for him in the 
near future is yours. You are out of town, and hence cannot be asked for 
protect your own life. She suggests that if you had exercised the privilege to protect a third 
party's life or property, however, you might owe the cabin owner less than the full cost of the 
harm done {p. 54). For a discussion of the latter situation, see text accompanying notes 19-22 
infra. 
15. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part IL 2 LA w & PHIL. 5, 
20-21 (1983) (emphasis in original). 
16. See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS§ 197, comment k (1965). 
17. See, e.g., Polebitzke v. John Week Lumber Co., 173 Wis. 509, 510, 181 N.W. 730, 732 
(1921) (trespass to land action against defendant who entered plaintiff's land to remove his logs 
that had floated downstream) ("Nominal damages are awarded because a party has sustained an 
invasion of his rights. Here the plaintiffs' rights were not invaded."); PROSSER & KEETON, supra 
note 4, § 24, at 147-48. 
18. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910); PROSSER & 
KEETON, supra note 4, § 24, at 147-48. 
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consent within the available time. You keep your supply of the drug in a 
locked box on your back porch. [pp. 51-52] 
If we break into your box, remove the drug, and feed it to the child, we 
can claim the privilege of private necessity, 19 but we will have to com-
pensate you for the value of the medicine.20 In Some Ruminations on 
Rights, Thomson questions the propriety of this legal remedy (pp. 64-
65). She suggests that, instead of putting the entire burden of meeting 
the child's need on us, the law should provide that we share the bur-
den with you (p. 65). If she is correct about this, she says "it follows 
that we need not reimburse you for the entire cost of repairing or re-
placing the box and replacing the drug, but only such part of that cost 
as leaves you to pay the same amount as each of the rest of us" (p. 65). 
Thomson's hypothetical can be used to encourage the student to 
think more carefully about the difference between a case in which the 
defendant invokes the privilege of private necessity to protect his or 
her own life or property21 and the case in which the defendant invokes 
the privilege of private necessity to protect the life or property of an-
other. 22 In the first case, it is appropriate to expect the defendant to 
reimburse the plaintiff fully for the harm done to the plaintiff's prop-
erty. In the second case, it may be more appropriate to expect the 
plaintiff to share with the defendant the cost of protecting the life or 
property of another threatened by an emergency. 
A torts professor might then modify Thomson's hypothetical to 
create a fact situation that raises the defense of public necessity.23 For 
example, there is a city filled with children who will die if they are not 
given your drug in the near future. You have a very large quantity of 
the drug in your garage. We break into your garage, remove the drug, 
and feed it to the children. Because the law allows us to claim the 
complete privilege of public necessity, rather than the incomplete priv-
ilege of private necessity, we are not liable to you for the cost of the 
drug that we have taken. The law places the entire burden of meeting 
the children's needs on you. 
Students almost certainly will be shocked at this outcome. The 
hypothetical will enable the torts professor to discuss the reasons for 
treating the defense of public necessity as a complete defense.24 It will 
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263(1) (1965). 
20. Id. at § 263(2) & comment e. 
21. Id. at §§ 197(l)(a), 263(1). 
22. Id. at §§ 197(l)(b), 263(1). 
23. Id. at §§ 196, 262; l HARPER & JAMES, supra note 9, at § l.16; PROSSER & KEETON, 
supra note 4, § 24, at 146-147; Hall & Wigmore, Compensation for Property Destroyed to Stop the 
Spread of a Conflagration, l ILL. L. REV. 501 (1907); Reynolds, Is "Public Necessity" Necessary?, 
29 OKLA. L. REV. 861 (1976). 
24. Dean Prosser explains that public necessity is a complete defense so that the "champion 
of the public" won't have "to pay for the general salvation out of his [or her) own pocket." 
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 24, at 146. Professor Reynolds observes that there are 
"three reasons for some continued degree of protection from liability for destruction of property 
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also provide a vehicle for considering whether the law would operate 
more fairly if it provided a mechanism for us to share the burden of 
meeting the children's needs with you. That should lead into a discus-
sion of whether it would be even fairer to spread the cost of supplying 
the drug over all the families of the children who benefited from it, or 
over all of the citizens of the community.25 Such a discussion would 
leave students with a much clearer understanding of the policy consid-
erations behind the law of public and private necessity than can be 
gleaned by reading Ploof v. Putnam, 26 Vincent v. Lake Erie Transpor-
tation Co., 27 and Surocco v. Geary. 2s 
There is another way in which Judith Jarvis Thomson's essays can 
enrich classroom consideration of the law governing public and pri-
vate necessity. Most torts casebooks do not include fact situations in 
which the defendant inflicts death or personal injury in order to save 
someone's person against an outside threat of harm. 29 A torts profes-
sor who wants to explore the application of the privileges of public and 
private necessity to such fact situations should tum to Thomson's es-
says entitled Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem (p. 78) and 
The Trolley Problem (p. 94). The core hypothetical in these two essays 
asks whether it is permissible for Edward to kill in the following case: 
Edward is the driver of a trolley, whose brakes have just failed. On the 
track ahead of him are five people; the banks are so steep that they will 
not be able to get off the track in time. The track has a spur leading off 
to the right, and Edward can turn the trolley onto it. Unfortunately, 
there is one person on the right-hand track. Edward can turn the trolley, 
killing the one; or he can refrain from turning the trolley, killing the five. 
[pp. 80-81] 
Students will need some background information before entering 
into a discussion of The Trolley Problem. The professor should first 
pose a derivative hypothetical designed to elicit a discussion of the law 
in the face of public calamity": (1) "[T]here is a need for swift action in the face of an impending 
disaster"; (2) There is a "need to offer protection to public employees"; and (3) There is a "need 
for special power in wartime." Reynolds, supra note 23, at 875-79. 
25. Professor Reynolds argues that the "community should respond with compensation for 
what has been destroyed," perhaps by preparing a plan for "emergency taxation" that would 
spread the pecuniary loss. Reynolds, supra note 23, at 879-81. Professors Hall and Wigmore 
take the position that the "sacrificed party" should be entitled "to be reimbursed, by the commu-
nity or portion thereof, to the amount of his [or her] compulsory sacrifice, less the ratable propor-
tion which would fall upon him [or her] as a member of the community or portion thereof." Hall 
& Wigmore, supra note 23, at 514-15 (emphasis omitted). See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra 
note 4, § 24, at 147. 
26. 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908). 
27. 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910). 
28. 3 Cal. 69 (1853). 
29. No torts casebook asks whether it would be appropriate to inflict death or personal injury 
in order to save someone's property, presumably because it is "reasonably clear that one would 
not have even an incomplete privilege to kill an innocent person to save property." PROSSER & 
KEETON, supra note 4, § 24, at 148. 
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of private necessity. Assume that Edward turns the trolley toward the 
one. Further assume that, by some miracle, the trolley stops a few feet 
before it hits the one. Edward gets out. As he steps onto the track in 
front of the trolley, he looks up and sees a boulder tumbling down the 
steep bank, coming directly at him. Edward knows that he would be 
killed or seriously injured if the boulder were to strike him on the 
head. Behind him is the trolley; on each side of him is a steep bank; 
ahead of him is the one. Edward runs forward, pushing the one to the 
ground so that Edward can get out of the way of the falling boulder. 
The boulder hits the ground between the trolley and the one. The one 
sustains minor cuts and bruises (as a result of being pushed to the 
ground); Edward escapes unscathed. In an action by the one against 
Edward for battery, may Edward invoke the privilege of private neces-
sity? And if so, must Edward nevertheless compensate the one for his 
cuts and bruises on the theory that private necessity is an incomplete 
privilege? 
The application of the privilege of private necessity to actions for 
death or personal injury "has received very little consideration."30 
Nevertheless, Professor Fleming speculates that a person in Edward's 
position could invoke the privilege of private necessity: "It could be 
... that one who is threatened with very serious injury may subject an 
innocent stranger to slight harm, disproportionately smaller than any 
from which he is himself trying to escape."31 Professor Bohlen is of 
the opinion that, if the privilege of private necessity is to be recognized 
in such circumstances, it should be characterized as an incomplete 
privilege.32 Thus Edward would have to compensate the one for "in-
fringing" his right not to be personally injured, even though Edward 
did not "violate" any rights of the one because Edward's conduct was 
"justified" under the circumstances. 
After the class has analyzed the derivative hypothetical, the profes-
sor should emphasize that Edward would be entitled to invoke the 
privilege of private necessity only if he inflicted relatively slight harm. 
Edward could not inflict upon the one "an injury equal, or closely 
approximate, to that with which he [was] threatened, no matter how 
impossible it [might have been] for him to otherwise escape the 
threatened injury."33 
Returning now to The Trolley Problem, Thomson says, "I do not 
suppose that if the trolley driver turns off to the right, killing the one, 
then he must pay compensation to the one's heirs" (p. 41). Further-
more, she suggests that the result would be no different if the trolley 
driver fainted and a bystander threw a switch that turned the brakeless 
30. Id. 
31. J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 89 (6th ed. 1983). 
32. Bohlen, supra note 13, at 321. 
33. Id. at 319-20 n.18; accord J. FLEMING, supra note 31, at 89. 
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trolley toward the one (p. 96). Why not? Because the law should treat 
this as a case governed by the complete defense of public necessity?34 
What if there had been fewer than five people on the track ahead? At 
some point does this become a case governed by the incomplete privi-
lege of private necessity, with damages payable to the survivors of the 
one?35 Is it appropriate for tort law to recognize the privileges of pub-
lic and private necessity at all when human life is at stake?36 And 
regardless of how a student would answer the above questions, would 
the student's answers be different if Edward were a transplant surgeon, 
and he killed a healthy patient in order to obtain five organs to be 
transplanted into the bodies of five sick patients?37 
These are difficult questions indeed. 38 Professor Thomson suggests 
that both the bystander at the switch and the transplant surgeon 
would "infringe" the one's "right to life" in the above hypotheticals 
(p. 106). She then searches for some difference between the cases that 
would explain why most people think that the bystander may throw 
the switch, but the transplant surgeon may not operate (p. 106). She 
concludes that the bystander at the switch is to be distinguished from 
the transplant surgeon by the following two crucial facts: (1) the by-
stander at the switch saves his five by making something that threatens 
them threaten only the one, and (2) the bystander at the switch does 
not do that by means which themselves constitute infringements of 
any of the one's rights (pp. 106-07). By contrast, the five patients are 
threatened by organ failure, and it is not that threat which the surgeon 
transfers to the one healthy patient (p. 107). Moreover, the surgeon 
who would save the five sick patients by killing the healthy one must 
34. Professor Bohlen suggests that the privilege of public necessity should be recognized 
when personal interests are invaded "for the purpose of protecting the public interest or of pro-
tecting others as well as the actor." Bohlen, supra note 13, at 323. In such cases, he takes the 
position that the privilege should be complete because "the actor should not be required to pay 
for his privilege by bearing a loss from which he derives no personal advantage, or from which he 
gets only a small part of the advantage." Id. 
35. Public necessity is a defense that may be invoked when a danger "affects ... so many 
people that the public interest is involved," but "[t]he number of persons who must be endan· 
gered in order to create a public necessity has not been determined by the courts." PROSSER & 
KEETON, supra note 4, § 24, at 146. Any case of necessity that does not qualify as a public 
necessity is a case of private necessity. If this case were classified as one governed by the privilege 
of private necessity, it would be analogous to the hypothetical in which we broke into your 
locked box to obtain the drug that would save the life of the sick child. See text accompanying 
notes 19-22supra. In other words, it would be a case of private necessity in which the defendant 
acted to save others, rather than the defendant's own self. 
36. Professor Fleming says: "What little authority there is seems to deny such a privilege, at 
any rate if it would involve serious bodily harm or death." J. FLEMING, supra note 31, at 89. 
37. Pp. 80, 95. For a discussion of this hypothetical, see Kadish, supra note 11, at 890. See 
also D'Amato, The Speluncean Explorers-Further Proceedings, 32 STAN. L. REV. 467, 469-75, 
481-85 (1980). 
38. For an excellent jurisprudential discussion of these questions in the criminal law context, 
see the fictional "Case of the Speluncean Explorers," in which four men who were trapped in a 
cave killed a fifth man and ate him in order to survive until they were rescued. Fuller, The Case 
of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949); see also D'Amato, supra note 37. 
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infringe the one's most stringent right to his body organs.39 
Although these distinctions may satisfy a moral theorist that the 
bystander may throw the switch, killing the one in order to save the 
five, courts of law might not recognize a privilege of necessity under 
such circumstances. Criminal courts traditionally have been reluctant 
to recognize a privilege of either public or private necessity in cases of 
murder or manslaughter, although the defendant's motive has been 
considered in mitigation of the punishment for the crime committed.40 
By contrast, the Model Penal Code section 3.02 provides that conduct 
believed to be necessary to avoid some harm is justifiable if "the harm 
or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that 
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged."41 The 
Model Penal Code commentaries suggest that the defense of necessity 
is available if a person intentionally kills one person in order to save 
two or more. 42 
Tort law can be expected to follow the criminal law of a given 
jurisdiction.43 Thus, if the criminal law does not recognize a privilege 
of necessity, it can be expected that tort law will not allow the by-
stander to invoke a privilege of necessity either. The bystander then 
would be obligated to pay wrongful death damages to the one's heirs 
- an outcome that is contrary to Thomson's proposed resolution of 
the case (p. 41 ). On the other hand, if a jurisdiction follows the Model 
Penal Code, the civil courts probably would recognize the privilege of 
necessity.44 Most likely, the civil courts would characterize the de-
fense as a privilege of public necessity, thereby exonerating the by-
stander from the payment of survival and wrongful death damages 
altogether.45 Of course, if the defense were characterized as an incom-
plete privilege of private necessity, then the bystander would be re-
39. Professor Laycock, in a critique of The Trolley Problem, says that the "distinction be-
tween diverting an existing threat and creating a new one has no explanatory power whatever for 
me." Laycock, The Ultimate Unity of Rights and Utilities, 64 TEXAS L. REV. 407, 409 (1985). 
On the other hand, Laycock is surprised that Thomson does not put a greater emphasis on the 
fact that the transplant surgeon would infringe the healthy donor's "strongest imaginable entitle-
ment to his own body organs." Id. at 408. After all, it was Thomson who wrote in A Defense of 
Abortion: "My own view is that if a human being has any just, prior claim to anything at all, he 
has a just, prior claim to his own body" (p. 8). 
40. w. LAFAVE & A. Scarr, CRIMINAL LAW§ 5.4, at 445 (2d ed. 1986). 
41. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.02 (1980). For a discussion of the Model Penal Code provi-
sion, see W. LAFAVE & A. Scarr, supra note 40, at 442-43. 
42. W. LAFAVE & A. Scarr, supra note 40, at 444. 
43. Professor Bohlen said: "If the exigency in which [the victim's] slayers were placed was 
not sufficient to relieve them from criminal punishment for his murder, a fortiori it would not 
relieve them from liability to pay compensation under a death statute for the benefit of his depen-
dents." Bohlen, supra note 13, at 320 n.18. 
44. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 24, at 148. 
45. See note 34 supra. The professor may want to explore the possibility of shifting at least a 
part of the loss from the one's heirs to the five workers or to the community at large. See text 
accompanying note 25 supra. 
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quired to pay damages to the survivors of the one.46 
What does it mean to say that the one has a right to life? Is the 
right to life absolute or contingent? Is there a difference between a 
moral theorist's answer to that question and a lawyer's answer? 
Should tort law be informed by moral theory? Should moral theory 
take into account the decisions made by judges in hard cases? These 
are some of the interesting questions posed by a juxtaposition of moral 
theory and tort law. Thomson's memorable stories in Rights, Restitu-
tion, & Risk both provoke and facilitate consideration of these fasci-
nating questions. 
Ill. FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY47 
A. Building Theory in the Classroom 
Several years ago, mostly in the early 1970s, some law schools be-
gan offering courses on "Women and the Law." In many instances 
these courses were the direct result of student demand. Often, it was 
the women students who put the course materials together, before 
finding some cooperative professor to "teach" the course. These 
· courses were viewed as important for the women students, because 
women's experiences and women's concerns had been left out of many 
traditional law school courses. The founding of these "Women and 
the Law" courses is often credited with planting the seeds for the sub-
sequent flowering of feminist legal theory or feminist jurisprudence 
courses. These "Women and the Law" courses, like women's studies 
courses in other disciplines, offered the unique opportunity to view 
many unrelated fields of law from a single perspective, the woman's 
perspective. And that, of course, told us a lot about the position of 
women vis-a-vis the law. · 
I teach my feminist legal theory class with a view towards giving 
my students an opportunity to explore how different legal theories 
might be used to improve women's status vis-a-vis the law. I expect 
my students to build their own theories. Theories require a certain 
amount of abstraction, and yet I am a firm believer that too much 
abstraction is bad. The theories must be built from the ground up. By 
that I mean we have to begin with specific cases, both real and hypo-
thetical. I also rely heavily on personal stories volunteered by my 
students.48 
Judith Jarvis Thomson's essays on abortion49 and privacyso are 
46. See note 35 supra. 
47. Professor Cain wrote this section. 
48. See Cain, Teaching Feminist Legal Theory at Texas: Listening to Differences and Making 
Connections, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. (forthcoming). 
49. A Defense of Abortion, pp. 1-19. 
50. The Right to Privacy, pp. 117-34. 
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helpful in asking students to build theory. Her stories are not real 
stories about real people and so one should not build theory from her 
stories alone. But her stories are concrete and her people more real 
than that abstract group of people behind the veil in the "original 
position."51 
In addition, Thomson's attempts to explain the differing responses 
to her trolley driver and transplant surgeon problems52 have helped 
me to explore with my students such abstract notions as "rights" and 
"responsibilities" and "autonomy" and "connection." In this section, 
I provide a brief overview of some of the ways in which Thomson's 
essays can be used to add concreteness to the search for theory. I also 
question Thomson's emphasis on "rights" to the exclusion of "con-
nectedness" and "relationship." 
B. Abortion 
A Defense of Abortion (p. 1) was written in 197h .two years before 
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Roe v. Wade.53 It is a 
very narrowly focused essay, intended to poke a hole in the moral ar-
gument that abortion is always wrong because it is an act of murder. 
That argument, says Thomson, is usually attacked by contending that 
the fetus is not a person. Thomson assumes, for purposes of discus-
sion, that the fetus is a person. But the fetus, like the famous violin-
ist, 54 does not have an absolute right to life. Thus, abortion, even if 
viewed as killing a person, is sometimes morally permissible. Specifi-
cally, Thomson argues that abortion is permissible to save the life of 
the mother (by analogy to self-defense),55 in the case of rape (by anal-
ogy to lack of consent), and when carrying the child to term would 
require the mother to be a Good Samaritan, as opposed to a Minimally 
Decent Samaritan (by analogy to the law governing the duty to res-
cue). That abortion is sometimes morally permissible is a sufficiently 
strong premise for her purposes. The premise implies, of course, that 
abortion is not always, morally permissible. 
Modern-day feminists might find her premise, because it is so nar-
row, not to their liking. Others may argue that her premise is irrele-
vant to the real issue in the abortion debate. The real issue is: Who is 
it who is to decide when abortion is morally permissible and when it is 
not?56 Other feminists may even disagree with the structure of her 
51. ]. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
52. The Trolley Problem, pp. 94-116. For a full statement of these hypotheticals, see section 
11.C supra. 
53. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
54. For a full statement of "The Famous Violinist" hypothetical, see section I supra. 
55. For a discussion of Thomson's views on self-defense, see section 11.B supra. 
56. Professor MacKinnon says with respect to debates over the moral rightness of abortion: 
"My stance is that the abortion choice must be legally available and must be women's, but not 
because the fetus is not a form of life. In the usual argument, the abortion decision is made 
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argument, claiming that it is antifeminist because it· is not woman-
centered. As Professor Catharine MacKinnon comments: 
Thus, for instance, Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument that an ab-
ducted woman had no obligation to be a celebrated violinist's life sup-
port system meant that women have no obligation to support a fetus. 
The parallel seems misframed. No woman who needs an abortion - no 
woman, period - is valued, no potential a woman's life might hold is 
cherished, like a gender-neutral famous violinist's unencumbered pos-
sibilities. The problems of gender are thus underlined here rather than 
solved, or even addressed. 57 
These critiques are understandable, but, in my opinion, they are 
not fair to Thomson's purpose. Remember, it was 1971 when this es-
say was penned. She pushed the moral debate forward by assuming 
for purposes of discussion that the fetus was a person with its own 
"right to life." She then argued from a woman's perspective that abor-
tion is sometimes morally permissible. 58 And although she may not 
have cherished the pregnant woman to Professor MacKinnon's satis-
faction, she tells a story that has valuable explanatory potential for 
nonpregnant persons. 
"Imagine being pregnant," I say to my students. Most students, 
notably the men, have little experiential data to support this imaginary 
experience. To some, pregnancy is mystical. It is something inti-
mately personal and, thus, not often discussed in public. Some stu-
dents immediately distance themselves from the project. But now try 
this: "Imagine that you wake up one morning back to back in bed, 
connected to an unconscious famous violinist." The hypothetical is 
stripped of all the personal history, of all the complications that one 
might bring to the reality of pregnancy. 
This "stripping" is both good and bad. It is bad because reality is 
where we live and where we make our moral (and legal) choices. It is 
good because transcendence of the intimately personal is necessary to 
enable our real conversations with others about moral choice. Thom-
son understands the importance of talking about concrete cases when 
one is developing moral theory (pp. 257-60). But she does not ac-
knowledge the potentially different uses of real and hypothetical cases. 
As a teacher of feminist theory, committed to the reality of women's 
experiences, I must be ever cautious in stripping too much of reality 
from discussions of abortion. I find the story of "The Famous Violin-
contingent on whether the fetus is a form of life. I cannot follow that. Why should women not 
make life or death decisions?" c. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 94 (1987) (emphasis in 
original). 
57. Id. at 98-99 (footnote omitted). 
58. Professor Robin West, in urging the development of a woman-centered "reconstructive 
jurisprudence," observes that "[f]rom a subjective, female point of view, an abortion is an act of 
self defense, (not the exercise of 'a right of privacy') .... " West, Jurisprudence and gender, 55 U, 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 69 (1988). 
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ist" valuable, but it must be accompanied by other stories, real stories, 
stories of women in physical pain, stories of fear, stories of 
humiliation. s9 
Thomson's essay on abortion plays another important role in de-
veloping feminist legal theory. Consider the story of the Good Samar-
itan, who "went out of his way, at some cost to himself, to help one in 
need of it" (p. 15). Now consider what a pregnant woman is being 
asked to do on behalf of the fetus. Certainly it is more than even the 
Good Samaritan did. He merely crossed the road to help a dying man. 
The Good Samaritan bound the injured man's wounds and took him 
to an inn, but he did not stay with him for anything close to nine 
months, nor did he risk physical pain or injury in giving aid. Thom-
son's point is that the law does not generally require the giving of aid 
(p. 16). When it does, it merely requires that the actor be a Minimally 
Decent Samaritan (p. 16). It does.not require anyone, other than a 
pregnant woman, to be a Good Samaritan. 60 
Professor Donald Regan, relying on Thomson's basic argument 
about the Good Samaritan, has developed a strong equal protection 
argument in favor of abortion rights. 61 He argues in part: 
To see the equal protection problem, we must look at abortion in a 
broader context. Life in society produces many situations in which one 
individual is in a position to give needed aid to another.individual. That 
is to say, life in society offers many opportunities to be a good or bad 
samaritan. The objection to an anti-abortion statute is that it picks out 
certain potential samaritans, namely women who want abortions, and 
treats them in a way that is at odds with the law's treatment of other 
potential samaritans. Women who want abortions are required to give 
aid in circumstances where closely analogous potential samaritans are 
not. And they are required to give aid of a kind and an extent that is 
required of no other potential samaritan. 62 
Given the problems created by Roe v. Wade's reliance on the right 
to privacy, 63 recent feminist writing has stressed the need for an equal 
protection approach to abortion. 64 The equal protection approach is 
especially important when one considers the plight of poor women 
59. The National Abortion Rights Action League submitted an amicus brief in Thornburgh 
v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), which contained thirty-eight real 
stories of abortion experiences told by women. See Henderson, Legality and Empathy, SS MICH. 
L. REV. 1574, 1635-37 (1987). 
60. In 1971, when Thomson wrote this essay, all fifty states had laws prohibiting abortion by 
choice, thereby requiring pregnant women to be Good Samaritans. P. 16. 
61. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979). 
62. Id. at 1622 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
63. For example, privacy arguments make abortion a matter of private choice, which is of 
little value to poor women who cannot afford the choice. Also, privacy arguments focus on the 
individual woman rather than on the collective needs of women. 
64. See, e.g., c. MACKINNON, supra note 56, at 93-102; R. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND 
WOMAN'S CHOICE 295-302 (1984); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. 
REV. 955 (1984). 
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who have no meaningful access to abortion. Thomson's essay pro-
vides a valuable first step in pursuit of this approach. 
C. Privacy and Rights 
"The personal is political." This simple feminist slogan has been 
assigned many meanings. The most constant theme underlying the 
slogan's various explanations is an attack on the distinction between 
public and private. The personal, previously private and protected 
from government interference, should be politicized, made public. In 
accord with this theme, some feminists argue that strong support for a 
right to privacy is harmful to women. 65 Other feminists argue that 
privacy is an important interest, that the sex/gender system has pre-
vented women from getting their fair share of privacy, and that femi-
nist theory ought to focus on women's right to privacy. 66 Whichever 
way you cut it, privacy is an important topic for feminist theory. 
Thomson's essay on privacy, The Right to Privacy (p. 117), was 
originally published in 1975. As with the abortion essay, it has been 
around long enough to engender numerous critiques. 67 Thomson's 
working hypothesis is that there is no separate right to privacy, but 
that instead the interests protected by privacy are all protected by 
other primary rights. For example, the right not to be listened to and 
the right not to be looked at, although part of the cluster of privacy 
rights, are derived from tpe more primary rights we have over our own 
persons (p. 126). Similarly, the right that our property not be looked 
at is derived from our more basic property rights (p. 124). In Thom-
son's view, the right to privacy is derivative in the following sense: 
[I]t is possible to explain in the case of each right in the [privacy] 
cluster how come we have it without ever once mentioning the right to 
privacy. Indeed the wrongness of every violation of the right to privacy 
can be explained without ever once mentioning it. [p. 133] 
Whether or not this is true in every case, it is certainly an interest-
ing claim. And of course, it is true for every case that Thomson posits. 
A man's right that you not look at his pornographic picture is derived 
from his property rights in the picture (pp. 120-24). An opera singer's 
right that you not listen to her sing (in private) is derived from her 
rights over her person (pp. 125-26). Torturing a man to get personal 
information is a violation of his "right to not be hurt or harmed" (p. 
129). As Thomson puts it, these people (the man with the porno-
65. For example, Professor MacKinnon says: "This right to privacy is a right of men 'to be 
let alone' to oppress women one at a time. It embodies and reflects the private sphere's existing 
definition of womanhood." C. MACKINNON, supra note 56, at 102 {footnote omitted). 
66. See Allen, Women and Their Privacy: What Is at Stake?, in BEYOND DOMINATION: 
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY 233 (C. Gould ed. 1984). 
67. See, e.g., Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Reiman, 
Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26 (1976); Scanlon, Thomson 011 Pri-
vacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 314 (1975). 
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graphic picture, the opera singer, the tortured man) have their respec-
tive rights (that the picture not be looked at, that the voice not be 
listened to, that the body not be tortured), but not because they have a 
right to privacy. Instead, they have these respective rights as primary 
rights, and it is because they have these primary rights that we say 
they have a right to privacy (p. 133). 
Thomson puts these thoughts forward as a tentative suggestion. 
She believes that thinking about the right to privacy in this way may 
help us to understand the nature of rights. If every time we say, "Aha, 
there is a violation of the right to privacy," we then push further to see 
if there is really some more basic underlying right, then perhaps we 
will remove some of the darkness that surrounds our understanding of 
rights. 
I agree with Thomson that pushing beneath the surface of every 
privacy hypothetical is a useful heuristic device. I think it especially 
useful to focus on hypotheticals that involve women, something that 
Thomson does too infrequently. Consider the right not to be looked at 
and not to be touched. These are rights that might be waived once a 
person walks into a crowd. Suppose that someone looks at your left 
knee because you absent-mindedly left it uncovered (pp. 124-25). 
Thomson suggests that in such a situation you might have waived 
your right to have your knee not looked at. But what if you are a 
woman and it is your left breast, not uncovered at all, and the look is 
not merely a look but a leer? And what if someone in a crowd touches 
your left breast, not accidentally. It is all well and good to describe 
these invasions as invasions of your rights over your person, or even 
over your body, but it does strike me that there are parts of your per-
son and of your body that are more private than others. Once we 
begin to make these sort of distinctions, between knees and breasts, for 
example, then I think we will begin to approach a deeper understand-
ing of privacy. 
Thomson's observation (that privacy rights are derivative because 
everything that they protect can be described without ever once men-
tioning privacy) tells us two different sorts of things, one about privacy 
and one about rights. What it tells us about privacy is linguistic. We 
talk less about the truly private parts of our lives, such as our most 
intimate sense of self, than we do about the public parts. It is easier to 
talk with others about the external, objective parts of ourselves, the 
parts that others see. Therefore, it should not be so surprising that we 
are able to describe large parts of "privacy" by using more public 
terms. 
Thomson's observation also suggests to us something about rights. 
What it suggests is this: In the realm of the truly private, where there 
is only "me," it is meaningless to talk of rights. Let me put it more 
concretely. Imagine Robinson Crusoe on his island without his man, 
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Friday. Imagine that there are no other persons in existence. What 
would it mean to say that Robinson Crusoe has a right? A right to 
life, a right to property, a right over his person? 
Rights, it seems to me, are dependent upon the existence of at least 
two persons. Rights, it seems to me, are moral descriptions of rela-
tionships. They say something about the way we think that relation-
ships between persons ought to be. Thomson, although she does not 
say it in so many words, recognizes this when she says in the 
afterword, " ... it seems . . . that to have a right just is its being the 
case that people may and may not treat you in these and those ways" 
(p. 253). 
Thomson's moral theory is quite clearly based on a concept of 
rights. Nowhere does she explicitly focus on the importance of rela-
tionships, 68 a theme that has emerged in recent feminist writing about 
morality and law.69 And yet the contingency that she is willing to 
assign to rights emphasizes the importance of context, including the 
importance of the relationships posited by the context. 
Take the right to life. Again and again, Thomson emphasizes that 
it is not absolute, that it is contingent. It is not sufficiently absolute in 
the case of the fetus or the famous violinist to force involuntary servi-
tude upon others.70 Nor is it sufficiently absolute to insulate Aggres-
sor from Victim. n 
The contingency of the right to life is pressed most thoroughly in 
her two essays on the Trolley Problem. 72 The trolley driver, you will 
recall, cannot stop his runaway trolley. He is thus faced with the 
choice of either killing the five workers in front of him or turning the 
trolley, in which case he will kill only one. Thomson concludes that 
he may save five lives by killing the one. And in the event that the 
trolley driver is incapacitated, Thomson similarly concludes that a by-
stander at the switch may tum the trolley toward the one in order to 
save the five. Thomson says that the one has a right to life, but not a 
right that the bystander at the switch not tum the trolley. 
Thomson wants to focus primarily on the means by which the five 
are saved and the one is killed. The means is the turning of the trolley. 
But as she soon makes clear in subsequent hypotheticals, sometimes 
the means (turning the trolley) infringes no right and sometimes the 
same means (turning the trolley) does infringe a right. It all depends. 
68. She does, however, note the unique situation of the mother and fetus as constituting a 
relationship upon which one might argue for unique duties of the mother. P. 11. 
69. See, e.g .• c. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); N. NODDINGS, CARING: A 
FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION (1984); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the 
Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 {1986). 
70. See Thomson's essay, A Defense of Abortion. Pp. 1-19. 
71. See Thomson's essay, Self-Defense and Rights. Pp. 33-48. 
72. See section II.C supra. 
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And what it seems to depend on, although Thomson does not say this 
explicitly, is the relationship between the bystander and the one. 
Consider one of Thomson's variants on the "bystander at the 
switch" hypothetical: 
The five on the straight track are regular track workmen. The right-
hand track is a dead end, unused in ten years. The Mayor, representing 
the City, has set out picnic tables on it, and invited the convalescents at 
the nearby City Hospital to have their meals there, guaranteeing them 
that no trolleys will ever, for any reason, be turned onto that track. The 
one on the right hand track is a convalescent having his lunch there; it 
would never have occurred to him to do so if the Mayor had not issued 
his invitation and guarantee. The Mayor was out for a walk; he now 
stands by the switch. [pp. 111-12] 
Is it morally permissible for the Mayor to turn the trolley on the 
one? Thomson's feeling is that it is not, because the one has a right 
against the Mayor generated by the promise. Others conclude that he 
may. Thomson speculates that they "think the right less stringent 
than I do" (p. 112). My guess is that, instead, they are focusing on the 
more abstract right of the one, the "right to not be killed," rather than 
on the relationship which generated the additional promissory right. 
My colleague, Professor Douglas Laycock, for example, is one of 
those who thinks the Mayor may turn the trolley. Laycock explains 
that the Mayor may proceed because, if it is morally permissible to 
take the life of the one in order to save the five, then surely it is permis-
sible to break a promise to the one in order to save the five. 73 
. Laycock's explanation separates the abstract "right to not be killed" 
from the factual context in which it arises and presumes that the right 
of the one is the same regardless of who stands by the switch. This 
explanation is satisfactory if you adopt a Kantian model of impartial-
ity in which all the persons on the track exert "equal pull" on the 
bystander at the switch. It is not satisfactory if you believe that per-
sonal relationships are sometimes relevant to moral choices. A femi-
nist explanation of Thomson's intuitive response to the "Mayor at the 
switch" hypothetical would focus on the relationship between the 
Mayor and the one. 74 It would not focus on an abstract right. 
Critical legal theorists have attacked rights theorists so often that 
the attack hardly bears repeating here. Rights are indeterminate and 
theories based on rights do not account for this indeterminacy.75 
Feminist legal theorists have joined the attack, pointing out that rights 
analysis focuses too much on the individual and begins with individual 
73. Laycock, supra note 39, at 411. 
74. See, e.g., Baier, Hume, the Women's Moral Theorist? in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 
37 (E. Kittay & D. Meyers eds. 1987). Baier argues that Hume's moral theory, unlike Kant's, 
centers on the cultivation of good character traits, the most important ones being those concern-
ing relations with others .• 
75. See Symposium: A Critique of Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1363 (1984). 
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male values as the norm.76 As she moves from essay to essay, probing 
the underpinnings of each right she seeks to understand, Thomson 
adds support for the critical claim that rights are indeterminate. Her 
conclusion, however, is not that there can be no coherent theory of 
rights. Instead, she concludes that the theory must be one that con-
templates the moral infringement of rights (p. 255). Thus, in Thom-
son's view, rights are not absolute, they may be infringed, and they tell 
us something about how people may treat each other. At the same 
time, they have moral force and, if infringed, the infringement leaves 
moral traces. It is clear to me from reading Thomson that she would 
place herself in what feminists describe as the justice tradition, associ-
ated with Mill, Kant, and Rawls.77 And yet the more I read her sto-
ries and see her willingness to admit the contingency of rights, the 
more I wonder if it would not be more appropriate to place her in the 
Aristotelian tradition in which "moral deliberation must determine 
the right thing to do, at the right time, in the right place, to the right 
person, in the right way."78 I cannot help but wonder why it is that 
she stays focused on the question of rights, rather than looking at the 
relationships that are present in the stories that she tells. 
I do not mean to argue for relationships over rights as a means for 
solving moral dilemmas. I merely mean to suggest that focusing on 
rights, to the exclusion of relationships, is not particularly helpful. 
Thomson's hypotheticals explicitly raise questions about the meaning 
of rights. (What does it mean for the one worker to have a right to life 
in the Trolley Problem?) Although Thomson fails to focus on the rela-
tionships created in her hypotheticals, they are always there, behind 
the scenes. 
The importance of these relationships is implicit, even in Thom-
son's own search for moral explanations. Consider the case of the sur-
geon who is faced with the choice of operating on one healthy patient 
to remove his organs in order to save the lives of five unhealthy pa-
tients. All agree that the surgeon may not proceed. But why not? 
Moral theory, says Thomson, must adequately explain the why not (p. 
258). The utilitarian, she suggests might explain the moral rule to be 
applied to the surgeon by looking to the consequences. Ultimately, 
µtility would not be served in a world in which surgeons were allowed 
to sacrifice their healthy patients for their unhealthy ones. And yet 
Thomson does not find this explanation satisfactory. As she puts it: 
76. See Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 
387, 400 (1984). At the same time, an appeal to rights has often been successful in improving the 
status of women. Thus, feminist litigators have a perspective on the use of rights that is more 
positive than the perspective of the abstract theorist. See Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and 
Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986). 
77. See WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY, supra note 74, at 4; see generally c. GILLIGAN, supra 
note 69. 
78. WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY, supra note 74, at 8. 
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[It] locates the moral source of the prohibition ... in the wrong place. 
Surely the reason why the surgeon must not proceed has to lie, not in 
what proceeding would cause other people, but in what proceeding in-
volves doing to the young man. The unhappiness which would be 
caused others by the surgeon's proceeding seems to be utterly insignifi-
cant by comparison with, and thus not adequately explanatory of, the 
enormity of the wrong which the surgeon would be doing to the young 
man himself. [pp. 259-260] 
Thomson attempts to locate the source of the moral prohibition in 
the young man himself. Her intuition is that the young man must 
have some sort of right. And yet her discussion focuses not on the 
young man, but on the surgeon and the young man together. To shift 
the focus from the young man individually to the relationship between 
the two may not solve the moral dilemma, but, for me at least, it adds 
explanatory power that is more satisfying. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Rights, Restitution, & Risk, Judith Jarvis Thomson attempts to 
demonstrate the validity of general ethical principles by testing them 
against specific hypothetical cases. Her aim is to build moral theory 
that can explain specific data, predict future data, and do so with mor-
ally satisfactory explanations. Her process is to use examples that are 
concrete and that pose significant moral dilemmas. Bernard Williams 
says of Thomson's examples: "They are starkly presented, and notably 
unsentimental" (book cover). 
We, as law teachers, attempt to demonstrate the right or wrong 
outcome in a particular case by applying similar general principles. 
Our point is to help our students build an understanding of legal the-
ory. There is a striking, and at times dangerous, similarity between 
the way in which we teach law and the way in which Professor Thom-
son teaches moral philosophy. 
Too often we, as law teachers, teach from case books in which the 
editors, concerned with the legal rule of the case, have edited out the 
factual richness. Too often we teach a case as though it were an ab-
stract hypothetical, disconnected from the circumstances in which it 
in fact arose. And when we create our own hypotheticals, we often 
talk of abstract plaintiffs and defendants, of gender-neutral A's and 
B's. 
Thomson's hypotheticals and our edited cases, pared of their full 
facts, are valuable teaching tools. A good teacher can use the stark-
ness of such stories to capture a student's attention. But when such 
stories are stripped of real human context, our intuitive reactions to 
them may be distorted. Therefore, when we are building moral and 
legal theory in the classroom, we must be sensitive to this risk. When 
stories are used as foundations for theory, perhaps they should be told 
in full. ' 
